It's been so long since I've done anything with this blog, I'm not sure whether anyone reads it anymore. But, just in case someone out there is interested, here we go:
First up in exciting news, an essay that I wrote on the Supreme Court's recent decision in J.D.B. v. North Carolina (a case about Miranda rights) was published by MLR's First Impressions (check it out here). The case itself is pretty interesting, but I focused on tackling what I think is the Court's misguided analysis of the "reasonable person test," something that comes up over and over in all kinds of different areas in law. If you (whoever you are) ever get a chance to read it, I'd love to hear feedback.
I also accepted a publication offer for the full-length article I was working on during my 3L year, which will be published some time in 2012. That one revolves around the use of the moral luck objection by law & economists against more traditional theories of tort law. It incorporates some of what I did for my senior thesis at Princeton, and can be found here. It's a little nuts thinking that I'm going to be on the other side of the process now, but I'm super thrilled that something I wrote is going to be published as a real-life, big-kid article.
In other news, I graduated from Michigan in May and have settled into Richmond for my clerkship, which I started a few weeks ago. The job is wonderful: I'm doing exactly what I like doing, and everyone in chambers is awesome. Jennifer, who's been hanging out with me here since we got back from France with my family, just started her firm job in DC. That means lots of commuting back and forth for a while, but I can handle it.
That about covers it, I think. I'll try to post more updates? We'll see how it goes.
Tuesday, September 13, 2011
Wednesday, March 16, 2011
Articles That Make Me Want to Tear My Hair Out
Here's one, from the New York Times, entitled "No Face, but Plants Like Life Too," which argues that "formulating a truly rational rationale for not eating animals, at least while consuming all sorts of other organisms, [is] difficult, maybe even impossible." The idea is that plants engage in similar-looking defense mechanisms as animals when attacked, and so the difference between eating the two isn't really all that great:
The most obvious response to Yoon's assertion is to have her read Peter Singer. The difference between plants and (some) animals is that (some) animals feel pain--they're able to suffer. There's a subjective experience brought about when you stab a pig that doesn't occur when you cut into an asparagus. Yoon, perhaps not surprisingly, is aware of this argument: "The differences that do seem to matter are things like the fact that plants don’t have nerves or brains. They cannot, we therefore conclude, feel pain." But she goes on to reject the idea that subjective suffering can serve as a basis for morally distinguishing eating animals from eating plants because "[s]lavery and genocide have been justified by the assertion that some kinds of people do not feel pain, do not feel love — are not truly human — in the same way as others."
I'm not totally sure how to respond to such a ridiculous argument, but here's my best shot: neither slavery nor genocide were based on the argument that particular groups of people don't feel pain. I don't have a history Ph.D., but somehow I don't see slave owners saying to themselves, "It's a good thing our slaves don't have any subjective experiences. They're, neurologically speaking, exactly the same as inanimate objects." But let's pretend that somehow, somewhere in the world, there was a person who justified slavery or genocide on these grounds. What could we say to them? How about, "Dear crazy person, please read a high school biology textbook. You have a view about neuroscience that is utterly, hopelessly wrong." To say we should reject a moral theory because some people don't understand basic science and therefore apply the theory incorrectly is just ridiculous.
This isn't to say that I think Singer's argument is right: I don't believe that moral obligations derive solely from the existence of subjective suffering. But it certainly isn't an irrational view.
But just like a chicken running around without its head, the body of a corn plant torn from the soil or sliced into pieces struggles to save itself, just as vigorously and just as uselessly, if much less obviously[,] to the human ear and eye.I eat meat (and should probably get one of these), so it's not like I have a dog in this fight. But Yoon's argument is, well, totally nuts.
The most obvious response to Yoon's assertion is to have her read Peter Singer. The difference between plants and (some) animals is that (some) animals feel pain--they're able to suffer. There's a subjective experience brought about when you stab a pig that doesn't occur when you cut into an asparagus. Yoon, perhaps not surprisingly, is aware of this argument: "The differences that do seem to matter are things like the fact that plants don’t have nerves or brains. They cannot, we therefore conclude, feel pain." But she goes on to reject the idea that subjective suffering can serve as a basis for morally distinguishing eating animals from eating plants because "[s]lavery and genocide have been justified by the assertion that some kinds of people do not feel pain, do not feel love — are not truly human — in the same way as others."
I'm not totally sure how to respond to such a ridiculous argument, but here's my best shot: neither slavery nor genocide were based on the argument that particular groups of people don't feel pain. I don't have a history Ph.D., but somehow I don't see slave owners saying to themselves, "It's a good thing our slaves don't have any subjective experiences. They're, neurologically speaking, exactly the same as inanimate objects." But let's pretend that somehow, somewhere in the world, there was a person who justified slavery or genocide on these grounds. What could we say to them? How about, "Dear crazy person, please read a high school biology textbook. You have a view about neuroscience that is utterly, hopelessly wrong." To say we should reject a moral theory because some people don't understand basic science and therefore apply the theory incorrectly is just ridiculous.
This isn't to say that I think Singer's argument is right: I don't believe that moral obligations derive solely from the existence of subjective suffering. But it certainly isn't an irrational view.
Saturday, January 29, 2011
I Don't Want to Read Crim Pro/Triumphant Return?
I randomly clicked on the link to this blog today and realized that it's been over a year since I've posted--that's more than a little sad. I could say that I'll be writing here more frequently, but I've made similar promises before. Still, since I'm trying to avoid my reading again, how about an update?
* I'm graduating in May! And while law school has been fun, I can't say I'm sorry to be leaving. The seminars were great, as was the independent work that I did, but lecture classes are tough: reading every day for the seemingly sole purpose of memorizing facts and having no opportunity to do any in-depth analysis=lame.
* I got published! It's on a very esoteric topic, but it was still pretty neat to see my name in print. I've been working on a second piece that's nearly complete, but we'll see whether I actually submit it for publication or have it accepted anywhere. Will I ever fully give up on the idea of becoming an academic?
* I'm almost done being editor-in-chief of the law review! The last year has been quite an adventure, and I'm very, very glad to have had the experience, but at the same time it's great to know I'll soon be finished. We'll be picking the new editorial board Superbowl weekend (bad timing, I know), so T-minus 8 days and counting.
* MLR has been running smoothly. Thanks to a really great group of editors, we've published each of our issues several weeks early (#5, the March issue, will be out shortly) and are hopefully leaving the journal in the same great shape we found it in last year.
* I'm moving to Virginia, then going to DC. I'll be clerking for a year and then will make the permanent (or at least semi-permanent) move to the District in 2012.
That covers the highlights, I think. Now we'll see if I can keep it up.
* I'm graduating in May! And while law school has been fun, I can't say I'm sorry to be leaving. The seminars were great, as was the independent work that I did, but lecture classes are tough: reading every day for the seemingly sole purpose of memorizing facts and having no opportunity to do any in-depth analysis=lame.
* I got published! It's on a very esoteric topic, but it was still pretty neat to see my name in print. I've been working on a second piece that's nearly complete, but we'll see whether I actually submit it for publication or have it accepted anywhere. Will I ever fully give up on the idea of becoming an academic?
* I'm almost done being editor-in-chief of the law review! The last year has been quite an adventure, and I'm very, very glad to have had the experience, but at the same time it's great to know I'll soon be finished. We'll be picking the new editorial board Superbowl weekend (bad timing, I know), so T-minus 8 days and counting.
* MLR has been running smoothly. Thanks to a really great group of editors, we've published each of our issues several weeks early (#5, the March issue, will be out shortly) and are hopefully leaving the journal in the same great shape we found it in last year.
* I'm moving to Virginia, then going to DC. I'll be clerking for a year and then will make the permanent (or at least semi-permanent) move to the District in 2012.
That covers the highlights, I think. Now we'll see if I can keep it up.
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